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Jon Parkin. Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious
Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640-1700. Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. $125. xi + 449. Review by
geoffrey m. vaughan, assumption college.
Jon Parkin argues that Hobbes’s method of reasoning—formulating a series of paradoxes that result in unconventional conclusions—was so powerful that his contemporaries (a) could not allow
him to turn men’s heads, and (b) could not refute him. Perhaps that
last is stronger than what Parkin actually claims. Rather, he says that
Hobbes’s contemporary critics chose to adopt many of his ideas
even while denouncing the author. The ideas were just too good to

216

seventeenth-century news

pass up, even if the “Monster of Malmesbury” was too dangerous
to range free. Something of a caricature of Hobbes was developed
to disguise their borrowings and warn others from even reading him.
One might describe this as the B.B. King method of refutation: “There
ain’t nobody here but us chickens.”
Far more than a chronicle of Hobbes’s reception between 1640
and 1700, this remarkable book provides new insight into the structure of Hobbes’s arguments, focusing upon what Parkin describes
as “Hobbes’s seductive ambiguity” (16). Yet one might characterize
Parkin’s argument in similar terms. For instance, in the Introduction
Parkin tells us that, had the Royalists won the Civil War, Hobbes
might very well have been “the toast of English society rather than its
philosophical bogeyman” (12). Yet the first chapter, which details the
reception of his work before Leviathan and largely while the war was
still being decided, records significant and persistent criticisms from
figures who would later develop into Hobbes’s greatest opponents,
such as Bramhall, and those who had no direct involvement in English
politics, such as Grotius (34-35). Could Hobbes’s reputation really
have avoided its fate?  This is a seductive speculation, but I cannot
tell if Parkin actually believes it.
Parkin does not set out to establish Hobbes as a conventional
Anglican or a straightforward Royalist. There is no grand effort at
revisionism here as he clearly states that Hobbes rewrote Christianity
in Leviathan in a “radical, and occasionally downright bizarre fashion”
(92). Nevertheless, Parkin does a very good job of explaining the ways
in which Hobbes’s arguments caught his contemporaries off guard
precisely by being so similar to them. In reference to Bramhall, but
applicable to many others, he writes, “As would so often be the case,
Hobbes’s theory, with its uncompromisingly paradoxical statements,
came under fire from those in danger of being associated with its
heterodoxy” (43-44). Hobbes’s conclusions were heterodox, his paradoxes were novel, but the trajectory of his arguments were unnervingly similar to those of many more mainstream authors. This, claims
Parkin, explains the excessive reactions to what were, at first, some
obscure little books. The second edition of De Cive and the subsequent
publication of Human Nature and De Corpore Politico merely entrenched
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the earlier responses. And once republicans started using his work to
refute royalism, the stage was set for the main event, Leviathan.
Parkin gives Leviathan its own chapter, covering the years 16511654, but the next two, “The storm (1654-1658)” and “Restoration
(1658-1666),” are also about his most famous work. Apart from select
scholars and, perhaps, a Continental audience, Leviathan did and will
always command attention. The chronological divisions of Parkin’s
chapters, while not novel, are ingeniously developed and portray a cascade of political events that pick up Hobbes’s book and dash it against
the dangerous rocks of the engagement controversy, the Protectorate, and the Restoration. That anything survived is testament to the
greatness of Hobbes’s work. That Parkin has three more chapters to
go lends credence to the suggestion that Leviathan is an immortal god.
In the Leviathan chapter Parkin presents a judicious account of the
changes between Hobbes’s earlier attempts at explaining his political
views and his masterwork. This section alone will become a touchstone
for scholars and students alike. He covers the argumentative structure,
novel content introduced in Leviathan, the remarkable rewriting of
Christianity mentioned above, as well as the “more obviously ludic
manner” (93) of the style. For many this last is the most arresting
feature of the book, and Parkin makes the important point that even
his political and philosophical opponents “could not resist reproducing his startling metaphors and formulae in their works” (94). The
title alone caused, as it still does, occasion for puns and jibes, and
Parkin’s near exhaustive recounting of the ways in which critics did
so is a pleasure to read.
The remainder of the book takes us to the end of Hobbes’s life
and the decade beyond. The constant in the story is that Hobbes’s
ideas were roundly denounced and repeatedly adopted. Far from
simply demonstrating similarities between Hobbes and contemporary
and later authors, Parkin provides detailed accounts of significant
borrowing without attribution. Doing so without attribution was
the key, for Hobbes had been so clearly and successfully caricatured
as a result of Leviathan that no one could risk revealing this source.
The plot in the story that Parkin tells revolves around which part of
Hobbes’s work was adopted. Some significant authors adopted his
contractarianism, others his materialism. Still others took hold of his
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minimalist doctrine of Christianity. All of these had to be denied, of
course, for the charge of Hobbism was both easy to attract and difficult to deny, as the legacies of Scargill and Cardonnel attest.
Hobbes was not spared popular political attention, which only
makes the story of his reception more difficult to follow and more
interesting. Thus the charge of being a Hobbist was both an intellectual slight and a social curse. Parkin livens his history with remarkable
quotations from sermons denouncing Hobbes. In this atmosphere
Republicans and Royalists, Tories and Whigs, High Church Anglicans
and Dissenters all hurled the term “Hobbist” at each other. As Parkin
puts it, his “arguments could be publicly condemned by all parties,
but at the same time used to further each of their agendas” (362).
For instance, Hobbes’s de facto account of sovereignty was useful to
almost every party at one time or another. Parkin comes closest to
explaining how this could be when he writes, “however disreputable
Hobbes might be, it is probably true to say that his was the most
coherent and widely known theoretical story about the relationship
between protection and obedience” (414). One might say that he ought
to have attended more to the coherent theory of the original author.
Parkin concludes his chronicle of the attempts to tame Leviathan,
the king over the children of pride, by explaining that these efforts
uncover “the strategies and tactics of his critics, but also the true scale
of Hobbes’s intellectual achievement” (416). This is certainly true, and
neatly explains what this reader finds so valuable in his book. However,
I am also left wondering if a similarly close study of the reception of
Hobbes’s ideas to the present day might not reveal the same scale of
achievement. What is the particular value of attending to his critics,
especially those whose intellectual achievements never amounted to
as much?  Is not Hobbes himself the more interesting subject? He
is, and what Jon Parkin has offered in Taming the Leviathan provides
us with every reason for returning to his works and questioning our
own strategies for challenging and adopting Hobbes’s ideas.

